Morality Fail

So a gent over at Big Hollywood is talking about Tolkien, and why he's better than the nihilist vermin who follow Michael Moorcock's Brechtian Marxist narrative. That was actually in the essay, and it is, in fact, true—both Moorcock and China Mieville are actual Marxists, so they have to "deconstruct" heroism, for the class-war. Also they're Anglos, so they need to keep alive their myths about the evil Middle Ages and oppressive Catholic Church, so they don't feel bad about their ancestors having the worst human rights record in Western Europe until Germany edged them out in the World Wars, acquired almost solely through what they did to Catholics.

But what was fascinating was all these people in the comments defending George Martin's (admittedly not purely nihilist) garbage. One thing they all seemed to like was Martin's idea that "War is Hell", a nonsense lie that managed to turn the greatest soldiers in Europe into Vichy surrenderniks. It's also a convenient justification for war-crimes, used by people who aren't actually cut out to be soldiers (like Germans and most Englishmen)—actual soldiers (like Frenchmen and some Americans) can more accurately describe their attitude as "War is Monday". Not only is it routine, it's a hassle you'd much rather avoid except for an unavoidable necessity. Just like the beginning of the work-week.

Anyway, though, a bunch of the commenters were praising the "moral ambiguity" of Martin's garbage. Now, I'll admit I prefer "moral ambiguity" to Goodkind's "moral clarity", but moral ambiguity does not actually exist. "Moral dilemmas" are purely the domain of idiots, or, more often, are the rationalizations of those who are uncomfortable with the moral course of action.

The only legitimate cause for uncertainty regarding morality is uncertainty as to facts; once one has reasonable certainty as to the facts their moral significance is clear, at least to an intelligent person with a rightly-formed conscience. Now, of course, once you establish "what is wrong" in a given situation, there is a question of what is prudent to do about it, but that is not a moral dilemma.

For instance, it is simply unsupportable that Saddam Hussein should not, ideally, have been removed. But, whether any particular actor should remove him, at any particular time, and by what means, are all legitimate areas of disagreement. But not because of some apocryphal version of national sovereignty that, in essence, denies the common bond of humanity—"Are we the world's policeman?" sounds uncomfortably similar to Cain's question. The disagreement is legitimate merely because it may not be prudent for any particular nation to dislodge him.